The Livingston Legacy
Three Centuries of American History
from the Symposium, June 6-7, 1986

TABLE OF CONTENTS print Printable Version
From the Symposium sponsored by the Friends of Clermont, Bard College/Hudson Valley Studies Program, and the New York State Office of Parks, Recreation, & Historic Preservation, Taconic Region, June 6-7, 1986

Robert R. Livingston
and the American Revolution

by Lorna Skaaren

The American Revolution meant different things to different people. This was true within the Livingston family, even within one generation. For Robert R. Livingston, Jr., it meant serving the public good in government and aspiring to a high-level position; for his brother Henry, it meant participation in the cause of the Revolution as an officer; for their younger brother, John Robert Livingston, the third son of Margaret Beekman and Judge Robert Livingston, it represented an opportunity for personal financial aggrandizement. The experience of John R. Livingston (1775-1851) provides fascinating insight into what it meant to be a merchant in the Revolutionary period in America.

John R. Livingston is an obscure figure in the history of the Revolution because his official participation was minimal and he held no public office. Edwin Brockholst Livingston’s The Livingstons of Livingston Manor tells us that John served briefly with the Manor Militia and held a commission for purchase of army supplies until early 1777. [1] What became of him after this date? He came to see the Revolution as a chance to make his fortune and sought any possible lucrative venture to reach that end. John saw no need to divide his time between public and private pursuits as his cousin Walter Livingston did. Rather, he focused his full energy on privateering and trade. This paper seeks to examine John’s life during the Revolution and to argue that aspects of his opportunism contributed to the struggle for and victory of America's independence.

With the outbreak of the Revolution, John at twenty-one years of age became Captain of the Livingston Manor Militia and was soon promoted to Major. Overseeing the militia members posed only frustrations as he found many of the tenants with Tory views and thus unruly and unwilling to do or go where they were ordered. More rewarding, perhaps, was his investment of time in a powder making business. In early 1776, the New York Provincial Government announced a need for gun powder mills in various counties and offered loans for their construction. John responded and built a mill in Dutchess County. [2] In May 1776, Egbert Benson, Chairman of the Dutchess County Committee, reported to the Congress that Livingston’s mill passed inspection and produced a good amount of gun powder within a week’s time. [3] Between June 1777 and June 1778, the mill furnished New York with eleven tons of powder. The New York government considered the mill's production important enough to order seven soldiers to guard the site after local Tories stole seven hundred pounds of the powder. [4]

In October 1776, John received a commission to purchase supplies for New York troops. [5] His life was changed by his purchasing trip to Providence, Rhode Island where he heard stories of daily captures of English ships and of great profits made in privateering. [6] Back home at Clermont, John became preoccupied with thoughts of making money. He began to invest in privateering ships and in January 1777 resigned his commission as major of the Manor Militia. [7]

With the British occupation of New York City, Boston became a focal point of trade, and in the fall of 1777 John contemplated the profits to be drawn from transporting goods from Boston to the Hudson Valley. Sitting with Henry Livingston over dinner at Clermont one evening in September, John asked whether anything could be made in trading in Boston. Henry responded that "a man with £20,000 could clear a great amount of money." [8] John envisioned himself making fifteen to twenty percent on goods sold in Boston and upwards of fifty percent in the Hudson Valley. With his money tied up in privateering, John proposed to his brother that Robert provide £10,000 to be laid out in a joint account with John doing the business and all profits and losses equally borne. Robert probably agreed to this or simply loaned him the money as, sometime later, John informed Robert that £1,000 was available to him. [9]

By December 1777, John had re-located to Boston. With the destruction of Clermont by the British the previous October and the financial difficulties the family was experiencing, the move to Boston probably appeared timely. Whether John pursued a Boston-Hudson Valley trade is hard to tell, but he did often supply his mother with goods as well as meeting Robert’s needs, particularly with liquor, which John imported in great quantities. [10]

Throughout the years of the Revolution, merchants developed an almost fanatical pursuit of profit, and John was not an exception. [11] This attitude led to troublesome situations which must have brought some embarrassment to his family.

One such case centered on procuring English goods, which were in great demand among the populace. An extensive illicit trade developed during the Revolution between patriot traders in upstate New York and New York City British traders. Alexander Hamilton estimated that by mid-1782, the British in New York City sold goods upstate amounting to £30,000 a year. John pursued this market in August 1778, when he made an agreement in Rhinebeck with Samuel Hake, a former New York Loyalist merchant. Hake was to purchase goods in New York City--up to £20,000 worth--and John, as an equal partner, was to dispose of the goods upstate on the best possible terms. The obstacle in carrying out this plan was in gaining clearance for Hake to come up the Hudson River with the goods.

Every sloop stopped on the River had to be reported to General Washington at Newburgh. John wrote to Hake several days after their meeting that his brother, Robert, had spoken with General Washington and passage was assured. Washington would approve the Hake sloop. [12] (The story given Washington was probably that these were personal items of the Hake and Livingston families.) Hake’s sloop, however, did not make it beyond Peekskill.

Concerned about the frequent shipment of articles from the enemy in New York City to points upstate, Governor George Clinton sought to end this traffic. He had Hake’s ship stopped and Hake placed under arrest. [13] John’s sister Janet Montgomery expected goods from Hake’s ship and wrote Clinton asking for them. Clinton informed her that Hake’s ship and the goods on board had been ordered to return to New York City, when, in fact, the articles were sold and the money--almost £10,000--was divided among the noncommissioned officers and privates of five different regiments. [14]

John apparently thought Hake would be released after a brief detainment as he wrote to Hake to spare no expense in saving the goods and that he had another scheme in mind. [15] Hake was not released, however, and remained under house arrest in Red Hook, where he seems to have gained much local support. Seventy-seven residents signed a petition asking Clinton to release Hake to parole, which Clinton refused to grant. Hake must have been rather vociferous in proclaiming his partner’s role in the affair and in denouncing the Livingston name, as two of John’s cousins--Robert G., Jr. and Gilbert R. Livingston--entered Hake’s apartment in December of 1778 and "beat and bruised him very much indeed," according to a report made to Clinton by David Van Ness and Herman Hoffman. [16] Eventually, Hake was released in an exchange of prisoners with the British. [17]

A second troublesome incident for John resulted from a business agreement John made with Benedict Arnold. In 1778 Arnold assumed command of Philadelphia after Washington left to pursue British troops in New Jersey. Arnold schemed with several Philadelphia merchants to monopolize trade in that city. He closed stores and shops, even prevented officers of the army from purchasing goods, while he privately made purchases on his own account, and then through his agents sold them again at exorbitant prices. [18] John, having learned of Arnold’s command, proposed to buy large quantities of goods in New York if he could gain credit there and to send them down to Philadelphia when possible. [19]

The plan never materialized as Philadelphians grew increasingly disgruntled with Arnold’s profit scheming, high living, and socializing with Tory society. Charges against him were presented to Congress and Arnold left Philadelphia in February of 1779. [20] The courts investigating accomplices in Arnold’s later betrayal at West Point accused John of supplying Arnold with goods, based on the earlier Philadelphia agreement. John presented Clinton with a sworn statement of the limit of his involvement with Arnold, pointing out that he had never supplied Arnold nor his men with goods. Robert also sent a defense of his brother’s innocence to Clinton. John was cleared of charges. [21]

John and Robert corresponded regularly throughout the Revolution. John’s letters to Robert in his first year in Boston reflected his concern not only with profit-making but also with the developments of the Revolution:

I am much chagrined that nothing is done to raise more troops for the ensuing Campagne... [and] afraid that Gen. Washington will be obliged to retreat as soon as the Enemy come out in the spring, which will be attended with disagreable consequences, as the Militia will be backward in turning out when that is the case. [22]
Along with his opinions on the war, John informed Robert of the climate of Boston at the end of October 1778--that the people "are a little frightened" by several reports of the British fleet approaching. John urged Robert to write more frequently to inform him of "what state our publick affairs are in." [23]

Robert’s concern for John in his first year in Boston was that John cultivate Boston society. At Robert’s urging, John visited the Hancocks. John wrote his brother of the hostility building between the Hancocks and the Adamses over the latter’s campaign to replace General Washington with Gates. [24] After early 1779, however, John’s letters reflected a total preoccupation with making money and less concern with the overall picture of the Revolution. This was due to the financial responsibilities of taking a wife, building a new house, and keeping up with the high living that Boston merchants were known to enjoy.

Robert East in Business Enterprise in the American Revolutionary Era states that John was especially active in privateering in Boston. [25] A privateer at the outbreak of the Revolution was a ship armed and fitted out at private expense for the purpose of preying on the enemy’s commerce to the profit of her owners, and bearing a commission or letter of marque from the government authorizing her to do so. Usually the government claimed a portion of the money realized from the sale of prizes and their cargoes with a part of it going to cover court costs which established the legitimacy of the seizure and the contents of the ship. The owners of the privateers received the lion’s share and a considerable portion was divided among the officers and crew as an additional incentive to securing prizes. [26] John’s privateering investments included the following ships. He held shares in the sloops Beaver, Chance, and Congress; and held shares in the brigantines Caesar, General Mifflin, Rising States (carried 480 men and 186 guns & cannon), and Success. He was owner of the brigantines Charming Peggy (named after John’s wife Peggy), Robin, and Viper (a 16-gun ship) . [27]

The commonly expressed opinion that privateering was little better than piracy, Gardner Allen points out in Massachusetts Privateers of the Revolution, did not apply to these men. Privateering served as a temporary navy for Americans in the Revolution when early efforts to establish a navy were unsuccessful, and privateering continued to serve as a force of harassment of British commercial ships throughout the Revolutionary War. [28] British merchants lost ships and cargoes to American privateers not only along the American coast and in the Caribbean but also in their own waters off the coasts of Ireland and England. Examples of encounters of American privateers with British ships can be seen in accounts of ships in which John held interests or owned.

The General Mifflin was a 20-gun ship which in 1778 boldly stationed itself near the British Coast and made several captures, one of them being a ship with a cargo of wine. On the Mifflin’s homeward passage from France, she battled with a British privateer of eighteen guns and eighty men, and gained the surrender of the men and the ship. [29] John’s brigantine Viper sailed from Boston in October of 1780, and near Cape Hatteras, its captain, Captain Williams, chased a 16-gun British privateer of New York City. A cannon exchange followed when Williams was hit by a musket ball and the British ship made her escape. The first officer took charge of the Viper and headed for the Capes of the Delaware when he encountered another English ship. The Viper crew succeeded in capturing the ship, which carried a cargo of beef, pork, and butter destined for New York City. [30]

Englishmen engaged in trade continually complained about the loss of ships to American privateers. For example, in February of 1778 testimony was given in the House of Lords that the number of ships lost by capture or destruction by American privateers since the beginning of the war was 733; their cargoes were estimated to be worth over ten million dollars. Merchants protested to Parliment the continuance of the war. [31]

The high rate of capture of British ships caused insurance rates to escalate and deterred many English merchants from shipping goods in English vessels. The solution was to have their goods shipped in foreign ships. One observer pointed out that the Thames was the site of unusual numbers of foreign ships, taking in cargoes of English commodities for various ports of Europe and the Caribbean. [32] Thus, the much sought-after English goods at home were supplied by American traders, who purchased them in Europe or on St.Eustatius, the Dutch island in the West Indies.

In early 1780, John informed his brother of his interest in going to Holland to drive a trade between Holland and St. Eustatius, which became a war-time international trading mecca and where the Dutch provided America with needed military stores. [33] A visitor to the island in 1781 reported over two thousand American merchants and seamen actively trading. [34] John, having experienced losses in some of his privateering ventures and in the devaluation of the pound, was very anxious to get into the Dutch market and expressed his willingness to put his Great Patent land and his New York house and lot up for mortgage. [35] Instead, he formed a partnership with David Dickson, who stationed himself at St. Eustatius, and with a Mr. Stockholm, who established himself in Amsterdam. John remained in Boston. Goods sent from Holland to the Dutch island, John informed Robert, could net fifty percent profit in hard money; tobacco, in turn, could be purchased cheaply at St. Eustatius and sent to Europe where it sold for high prices. [36]

John was restless at home, however, and desperate to make a fortune before the close of the war. Upon hearing that some American patriot merchants were boldly entering British harbors, buying English goods directly, and then selling them in New York for a sizeable profit, John could not be held back. He planned to enter this market and presented his deal to Robert Morris, a successful merchant and future secretary of finance, in hopes of gaining financial backing. Morris disapproved and castigated John for wanting to trade with the enemy. Morris was sure that Dr. Franklin would not grant such a permit. John felt Morriss’ objection was a matter of opinion and believed that Franklin would allow any person a pass upon taking an oath of allegiance. [37] It took Robert to talk him out of it. Robert asked for John’s promise to confine his trade to Holland and France, to which John reluctantly agreed. [38] John’s financial condition must have appeared grave at this point as he confessed to Robert "poverty is a curse I can’t bear with it a man had better not exist and you must know that the family are too much distressed themselves to afford me any assistance." [39]

Robert proved to be a very patient and caring brother to John, who asked favors in letter after letter. In late 1781, John asked Robert to work at getting him appointed agent for supplying the French ships. [40] John later learned that the French were supplying their own war commissary. In early 1782, he appealed to Robert in Philadelphia to influence Robert Morris, now secretary of finance, to appoint him agent for the Continental navy, even though there were only a few ships at the time. Still, he told Robert,

It may lead to something more should the War continue & Congress fit out some ships.. .and what will be of still greater importance is that a man is considered of much more consequence by having a publick commission of that kind especially in Europe where I could wish our Credit to be in good estimation.... This is a matter that may be a means of making my fortune, and everything should be tryed to obtain it. [41]
When he learned that Morris had already appointed an agent, he thanked Robert for his efforts and lapsed into a temporary depression.

John soon recovered when fifty thousand livres arrived from France sent by Dickson and Stockholm, and he renewed his efforts to expand his trade contacts in Europe. [43] In July 1782, John reported that he and his partners could get almost any quantity of goods in France, Holland, England, Sweden, Germany, Denmark, and Belgium, but that they were not fully established in all the trading houses of Europe. He therefore asked Robert to procure letters of recommendation--pointing out that the more letters he had, the cheaper the goods would be. A letter from Robert Morris, whose father ran a large manufactory of cotton goods in France, was greatly desired. [44]

The concern among merchants in general, in 1782, was when the war would end. Many merchants, anticipating a difficult aftermath, keenly watched the approach of peace. [45] John hoped his brother could forecast this time and stated: "I wish extremely, to know whether we shall have a peace this year as we are dipping very largely into business--and if it takes place without a proper warning may ruin us." [46] For their own interests, the merchants hoped the war would last long enough to realize their hoped-for fortunes, but John allowed that his personal gain would be trivial when compared to the happiness of thousands. Facing the reality of a coming peace, John informed Robert he would arrange his affairs so as not to be much injured by the War’s end. [47] Still, at the close of the war, John was disappointed that he had not made the fortune he so single mindedly worked toward.

I have tried to show that John R. Livingston, like other merchants, had few scruples about exploiting the Revolutionary War to advance his financial situation. Yet one must recognize that in his drive toward wealth, specifically through privateering, he contributed to the ending of the war and to the winning of America’s independence. Edgar Maclay states: "In all the memorials presented to Parliament the arguments used to bring about peace with America was the unprecedented destruction of British commerce." [48]

Notes

  1. Edwin Brockholst Livingston, The Livingstons of Livingston Manor (New York: The Knickerbocker Press, 1910), pp. 229, 522, 530, 536, 556.
  2. American Archives, Fourth Series, Vol. V (Washington, D.C.: Peter Force, 1853) p. 378.
  3. American Archives, Fifth Series, Vol. I (Washington, D.C.: M. St. Clair Clarke and Peter Force, 1853) p. 144.
  4. Journals of the Provincial Congress, Vol. I (Albany: Thurlow Weed, 1842) p. 551.
  5. American Archives, Sixth Series, Vol. III (Washington, D.C.: Peter Force, 1853) p. 218.
  6. John R. Livingston to Robert R. Livingston, October 11, 1776, Robert R. Livingston Papers (Sanford, N.C.: Microfilm Corporation of America, 1980?) reel 1.
  7. Ibid.
  8. Ibid., August 29, 1777.
  9. Ibid.
  10. Ibid., December 18, 1777.
  11. Robert East, Business Enterprise in the American Revolutionary Era (New York: AMS Press, Inc., 1969) p. 81.
  12. Public Papers of George Clinton, Vol. V (Albany: James B. Lyon, 1901) pp. 298-299.
  13. Public Papers of George Clinton, Vol. IV (Albany: James B. Lyon, 1900) p. 233.
  14. Public Papers of George Clinton, Vol. V. p. 739.
  15. Ibid., p. 298.
  16. Public Papers of George Clinton, Vol. IV, pp. 333—334.
  17. Public Papers of George Clinton, Vol. VII, (Albany: James B. Lyon, 1904) p. 158.
  18. J. Thomas Scharf and Thompson Westcott, History of Philadelphia 1609—1884 Vol. I (Philadelphia: L.H. Everts & Co., 1884) pp. 388-391.
  19. Public Papers of George Clinton, Vol. VI (Albany: James B. Lyon, 1902) pp. 428-430.
  20. Scharf and Wescott, pp. 338-391.
  21. Public Papers of George Clinton, Vol. VI, pp. 42 8—4 30
  22. John R. Livingston to Robert R. Livingston, March 10, 1778.
  23. Ibid., February 24, 1778.
  24. Ibid.
  25. East, p. 66.
  26. Ibid., p. 7.
  27. JRL to RRL, October 11, 1776, reel 1; JRL to RRL, May 5, 1782, Reel 2; Gardner Allen, Massachusetts Privateers of the Revolution (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1927), pp. 96, 148, 265, 317; Library of Congress, Naval Records of the American Revolution, 1775-1788 (WasTiington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1906) p. 466.
  28. Allen, p. 15.
  29. Edgar S. Maclay, A History of American Privateers (CambrIdge: Harvard University Press, 1927) p. 88.
  30. Ibid., pp. 208, 209.
  31. Ibid., pp. xii, xiii.
  32. Allen, p. 18.
  33. JRL to RRL, February 13, 1780, reel 1.
  34. East, p. 177.
  35. JRL to RRL, March 29, 1780, reel 1.
  36. Ibid.
  37. Ibid.
  38. Ibid., August 7, 1780, reel 1.
  39. Ibid., November 15, 1780, reel 1.
  40. Ibid., December 19, 1781, reel 2.
  41. Ibid., March 28, 1782, reel 2.
  42. Ibid., May 5, 1782, reel 2.
  43. Ibid., July 17, 1782, reel 2.
  44. Ibid.
  45. East, p. 245.
  46. JRL to RRL, undated, reel 2, frame 700.
  47. Ibid., September 4, 1782, reel 2.
  48. Maclay, p. xiii.

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